Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative Studies by John Joseph Wallis & Wallace E. Oates
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative Studies
Volume Author/Editor: Harvey S. Rosen, ed.




Chapter Title: Decentralization in the Public Sector: An Empirical Study of
State and Local Government
Chapter Author: John Joseph Wallis, Wallace E. Oates
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7882
Chapter pages in book: (p. 5 - 32)1  Decentralization in the Public 
Sector: An Empirical Study 
of  State and Local 
Government 
John Joseph Wallis and Wallace E. Oates 
1.1  Introduction 
Decentralized choice in the public sector (as in the private sector) 
provides an opportunity to increase economic welfare by tailoring lev- 
els of  consumption to the preferences of  smaller, more homogeneous 
groups. More centralized decisions typically involve relatively uniform 
levels of consumption that circumscribe the diversity of outputs needed 
to accommodate differences in tastes. The existing literature in local 
public finance has explored the normative theory of  decentralization 
in  substantial depth. The important Tiebout model, for example, de- 
scribes the way in which mobile consumers through their location de- 
cisions can make use of decentralized choice in the public sector to 
enhance the efficiency of resource allocation. 
The purpose of  this paper is to explore empirically the extent and 
variation in  fiscal decentralization in  the state and local sector in the 
United  States. The state-local  sector exhibits wide variation  in  the 
relative roles of  state and local government both over time and across 
states. In 1902, local governments accounted for 82 percent of the tax 
revenues in the state-local sector; by  1982, this had fallen to 43 percent. 
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Likewise, wide variations in  the extent of fiscal decentralization are 
evident among states. In 1981, for example, state government spending 
in New York accounted for only 28 percent of total state-local expen- 
ditures in contrast to Vermont, where the state government share of 
spending was 60 percent. 
In this paper, we shall investigate the extent to which the existing 
theory of decentralized fiscal choice can explain the observed patterns 
in  the  structure of  the  state-local sector both  over time and across 
states. Our approach is to set forth the conditions that would enhance 
the potential welfare gains from a more decentralized public sector and 
then to see if  the presence of  these conditions is, in  fact, associated 
with greater fiscal decentralization. Using a large panel data set of the 
U.S. state-local sector reaching back to 1902, we explore econometri- 
cally the variation both over time and across states in various measures 
of fiscal centralization. 
In the first part of  the paper we provide a historical overview of the 
trends in fiscal centralization during the twentieth century. A pervasive 
tendency toward centralization in the state-local “fisc” is evident; there 
are also some interesting regional differences with historical roots. In 
the  second  section, we  discuss the  circumstances that  enhance the 
potential welfare gains from fiscal decentralization and formulate some 
specific testable hypotheses concerning the determinants of the optimal 
degree of decentralization. The third section then presents the findings 
from  our  econometric  analysis,  where  we  make  use  of  the  error- 
components approach to our panel data set to test the hypotheses. The 
final section of the paper offers some reflections on likely future ten- 
dencies in the centralization of the state-local sector. In addition, we 
include an appendix that describes our data base. 
1.2  Trends in Fiscal Centralization in the State and 
Local Sector during the Twentieth Century 
We  begin our investigation of fiscal centralization with an overview 
of the trends in the vertical structure of the state and local sector during 
the present century. At  the outset, we acknowledge the difficulty of 
developing a fully satisfactory measure of the extent of decentralization 
(see Oates  1972, 196-98).  Available data essentially limit us to fiscal 
measures, and, following earlier work, we will  use the fiscal share of 
the state government in the state-local sector as our measure of fiscal 
centralization. 
Even this does not resolve all the ambiguities, since we can construct 
fiscal “centralization ratios” (i.e., the state share in the state-local fisc) 
on  either an  expenditure or revenue basis.  Should we  measure the 
relative  importance of a level of  government by  the share of public 
revenues that it raises or by its share of public expenditures? The basic 7  Decentralization in the Public Sector 
issue here is how to treat intergovernmental transfers of  revenues. If 
we use a revenue measure, we attribute such funds to the grantor. This 
seems sensible if the grantor prescribes to a significant extent the use 
of the funds. However, where such funds are transferred uncondition- 
ally (say, under a revenue-sharing program) so that the grantor is simply 
a revenue-collection agent for the recipient, it may make more sense 
to attribute the funds to the transfer recipient. Since grants of  both 
kinds are widely used  in  the public sector, we shall not opt for one 
measure over the other; instead we shall present fiscal centralization 
ratios in both revenue and expenditure terms and note where the two 
measures generate divergent results. 
Table 1.1 presents the state and local government shares in  public 
expenditure for  selected years.’ These are the respective  shares in 
“direct  expenditure”  (that is, in disbursements to final recipients  of 
government payments) so that intergovernmental transfers of funds are 
attributed to the recipient level of government. The most striking fea- 
ture of table  1.1 is the dramatic increase in fiscal centralization that it 
reveals  over the current century. The state share of  state and local 
spending was only 12.4 percent in  1902; by  1982, this figure had risen 
to 40.5 percent. On closer inspection, however, the table reveals an 
interesting feature of the process of centralization: nearly all of this 
process seems to have taken place in the first half of the century. By 
1952, the state share had risen to 35 percent (in fact, in 1950 this share 
was 39 percent). Since 1950 the state share in  state and local sector 
expenditure has grown only very slightly. 
What accounts for this trend toward centralization? There are logi- 
cally three ways in which changes in these shares can occur: the ser- 
vices that  states perform may  have grown in fiscal terms relative to 
Table 1.1  State and Local Government Shares in State-Local Expenditures 
for Selected Years (in percentages) 





























Source: The figures from which these percentages were computed come from Tax Foun- 
dation, Inc., Fucrs and Figures on Government Finance, 23d  biennial ed., (New York: 
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those of local governments; there may have been a shifting of services 
from local to state governments; or  certain new services may have been 
introduced with a disproportionate assignment of these new services 
to the state government level. A closer investigation indicates that the 
explanation  is largely  a matter of  the last of these alternatives:  the 
state-local sector was called upon to provide a number of new services 
in the first half of the century with state governments playing the more 
important role.  In particular,  state governments over this period en- 
tered into the provision of highways, higher education, public welfare, 
and various retirement and unemployment compensation programs that 
account for the bulk of the expansion in the state share. For highways, 
for example, state governments in the aggregate spent only $4 million 
in  1902; with the advent of the automobile, state level expenditures 
rose to $2.56 billion by  1952. This represents an increase in the state 
share of total state and local  spending on highways from 2.0 percent 
in 1902 to 55 percent in 1952. The relative role of state government in 
education likewise exhibits a striking expansion. In 1902 we find state 
governments in the aggregate spending only $17 million on education; 
by 1952 this figure has become $I .49 billion. This represents an increase 
in the state share of educational spending from 7 percent in 1902 to 18 
percent in 1952. The major portion of this spending is for public higher 
education in which state governments have taken the lead. 
Similarly, state governments in the first half of the century greatly 
expanded their efforts in the provision of public welfare support. Ag- 
gregate spending by  state governments on public welfare grew from 
$10 million in 1902 to $1.4 billion by 1952, representing an increase in 
the state share of public welfare expenditures from 27 percent in 1902 
t,  51  percent in  1952. Much of this growth, incidentally,  took place 
during the New Deal years when the federal government relied heavily 
on state governments for the operation of relief programs (see Wallis 
1984, 1987). Finally, there was a rapid  expansion  of  state insurance 
trust fund expenditures, including unemployment  compensation and 
retirement benefits (again associated with the New Deal),  from virtually 
zero in  1902 to $1.4 billion in  1952. 
We thus find that the centralizing trend in state and local expenditures 
is largely a phenomenon of the first half of the century and represents 
an expansion of state governments into the provision of several major 
new public services. State governments, in  fact, played a very minor 
fiscal role at the turn of the century, but in the ensuing 50 years they 
became an equal fiscal partner in the state and local sector. This ex- 
pansion of the relative role of the states would seem not to be purely 
politically motivated; there is a sound economic case for state provision 
of the services that expanded so rapidly in this period. The need for a 
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of government transcending that with a purely local orientation. Like- 
wise, the development of a viable system of higher education reaching 
out beyond major urban centers requires a supra-local presence. And, 
finally, as has been argued in the pubic finance literature (e.g.,  Oates 
1972), there are serious constraints on the ability of local governments 
to provide assistance to the poor; the need for programs at higher levels 
of government for poor relief is widely recognized. 
If we examine the trends in fiscal centralization from the perspective 
of revenues rather than expenditures, we find roughly the same picture 
except that levels of  centralization are generally a bit higher for rev- 
enues than for expenditures. Table 1.2 reports state and local shares 
in  revenues from own sources. The major difference between tables 
1.1 and 1.2 is that the latter attributes intergovernmental revenues to 
the level of government that is the source (not the recipient) of the 
funds. Using a revenue measure of fiscal centralization, we find again 
a quite dramatic trend toward fiscal centralization. The state share of 
state-local revenues from own sources was only 17.6 percent in 1902; 
by 1982 this had risen to 56.8 percent. Thus, state governments shifted 
from being a relatively minor partner in  the fund-raising function of 
the state and local sector at the beginning of the century to becoming 
the major partner by  1982. Once again, we find that the bulk of  this 
centralizing process took place in the first half of the century; by 1952, 
the state’s share in  state and local revenues was already over 50 per- 
cent. Since midcentury, there has been some further centralization of 
revenues, but the trend has slowed significantly. This has been accom- 
panied by a continuing increase in the reliance on state intergovern- 
mental grants to local governments. Table  1.3 documents this trend 
with figures indicating the fraction of  local revenues coming from in- 
tergovernmental transfers; the rise in  this figure over the first half of 
the century has continued since 1950. 
Table 1.2  State and Local Government Shares in State-Local Revenues from 
Own Sources for Selected Years (in percentages) 
Year  State Share  Local Share 
I902  17.6  82.4 
1913  17.8  82.2 
1922  24.4  75.6 
1932  29.7  70.3 
1942  48.9  51.1 
1952  50.4  49.6 
1962  48.9  51.1 
1972  52.9  47. I 
1982  56.8  43.2 
Source: Same as Table  1.1. 10  John Joseph Wallis and Wallace E. Oates 
Table 1.3  Intergovernmental  Transfers as a Percentage of Local Government 
Revenues for Selected Years 
1902  6.6 
1913  6.0 
I922  8.3 
1932  14.3 
1942  27.8 
1952  31.6 
1962  30.6 
1972  37.7 
1982  41.5 
Source: Tax Foundation,  Fucrs und Figures, Table F14, p. f19. 
The fiscal evolution of the state and local sector thus reveals a very 
striking tendency toward centralization in both spending and revenues 
over the first half of the century. This trend has moderated since 1950, 
however, with only a very slight increase in the state share of  fiscal 
activity since then. 
In addition to a strong secular trend toward a more centralized state 
and local sector, there is also a persistent and interesting  historical 
pattern of  centralization across regions. The southern regions of  the 
country in  1902 had much more concentrated public sectors than did 
the other regions of  the nation. Table 1.4 presents our fiscal centrali- 
Table 1.4  Fiscal Concentration Measures by Region, by  Year -  1902 to 1982 
Revenues/Expenditures 
Region  I902  1922  1942  1962  1982 
New England 
Mid-Atlantic 
East North Central 
West North Central 
South Atlantic 
East South Central 
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0.396 
Nore: First  row  for  each region  is  revenue  measure: second  row  for each region  is 
expenditure measure. 11  Decentralization in the Public Sector 
zation measures for both expenditures and revenues for twenty year 
intervals from  1902 to 1982. In  1902 state governments in the South 
Atlantic and East South Central regions accounted for roughly twice 
as much of the state-local fisc as did  state governments in the Mid- 
Atlantic or East North Central regions; other regions fell between these 
two extremes. While regional differences have narrowed with time, the 
southern regions still remained slightly more centralized in  1982. 
These regional differences may reflect to some extent the variation 
in the underlying economic, social, and demographic factors that we 
discuss in the next section. There are, however, strong historical dif- 
ferences in the structure of the state-local  sector that must be kept in 
mind. Colonial land laws were particularly  important. Although both 
the  southern and  northern colonies  began  under the same Virginia 
Company charter, the two regions developed distinctly different ways 
of  establishing private  property rights  in  land. In  Virginia and sur- 
rounding colonies, an individual was allowed to decide which specific 
parcel of land  he would take title to. People  took their 50-acre head 
rights, for example, in the best bottomland available, leaving hilltops 
and scrub land to the colonial government. 
In the New England colonies, under the  joint influence of the Virginia 
Company charter and the Massachusetts Bay Colony charter, the colo- 
nial government generally made large grants of land to towns. These 
grants were typically  ten miles  square and were made to an already 
existing group of prospective townsmen. The colonial land grant was 
to the town, not to individuals, and the town council then distributed 
lands to the members of the community (occasionally selling land di- 
rectly). This method of land distribution accounts for (perhaps it would 
be better to  say “was endogenous with”) the importance of community 
leaders and institutions like the local minister and the church, as well 
as for the vigor of the typical New England town meeting. 
The New England method of distributing land led naturally to a very 
active local political life, and it created local governments which had, 
from the very beginning, considerable real assets at their disposal. In 
contrast, the process of distributing land in the South did very little to 
encourage local governments. In many areas large land owners were 
the effective government, and local agreement to levy taxes on them- 
selves would only occur on issues on which  there was considerable 
agreement. Indeed, the effects of land policy  are still visible on the 
maps of southern states today. The numerous small counties and tor- 
tured boundary lines follow the borders of the existing private property 
distribution at the time the counties were formed. This contrasts sharply 
with the geometric precision of New England townships. 
The compromise between northern, southern, and other interests 
that led to the Northwest Ordinances of 1785 and 1789 created a method 
for establishing private property rights over federal lands in the Old 12  John Joseph Wallis and Wallace E. Oates 
Northwest and eventually the trans-Mississippi West that followed the 
New England model in  geometry and the southern model in  individ- 
uality: land was sold in rectangular plots, but sold directly to individ- 
uals.  And,  importantly,  the  ordinances  retained  the  New  England 
principle of  providing for the support of local government by allotting 
fixed amounts of  land  for the  support of  schools and  other public 
functions. 
The result of this historical development was relatively strong local 
governments in the northern and western regions of  the country and 
relatively weak local governments in the southern regions. These re- 
gional differences persisted well into the twentieth century. Unlike the 
trend toward centralization (most of which had taken place by  mid- 
century), the  near  equalization  of  fiscal centralization ratios  across 
regions appears to be a phenomenon of the latter half of  the century. 
Centralization ratios take a sharpjump upwards between 1922 and 1942, 
but they retain their pattern of  regional differences into the 1960s. 
1.3  The Economics of Decentralization in the Public Sector: 
Toward Some Testable Hypotheses 
The decentralized provision of public services provides a means to 
increase the level of economic welfare by differentiating levels of public 
outputs according to the demands of  local constituencies. The mag- 
nitude of the potential gains from such decentralization depends upon 
the variation in the optimal levels of public outputs across jurisdictions. 
If  the optimal level of output varies little from one jurisdiction to an- 
other, then the welfare losses from providing a uniform level of output 
of public services across all jurisdictions will tend to be relatively small. 
The case for decentralized provision will, in  such instances,  be less 
compelling than where desired outputs vary widely from one area to 
another.* 
The general approach in this study will  be to identify the conditions 
that enhance the welfare gains from decentralization and then to see 
(in the next section) if these conditions can “explain”  in econometric 
terms the observed variation in fiscal decentralization in the state and 
local sector both over time and across states. The primary determinants 
of the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization encompass three classes 
of variables: 
1.  Conditions relating to the land area of  the state, the size of  its 
population, and the geographical distribution of the population 
2.  The level of income and wealth in the state 
3. The extent of diversity of tastes for public outputs and their geo- 
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We  shall consider each of these classes of determinants in turn and see 
what they imply in terms of testable hypotheses. 
The size of the state both in terms of population and land area has po- 
tentially important implications for the optimal degree of decentraliza- 
tion. That is, in certain ways, a fairly obvious point. A large jurisdiction 
with a sizeable population offers more opportunities for welfare-enhancing 
decentralization. As John Stuart Mill observed over a century ago in his 
tract on Representative Government, “There is a limit to the extent of 
country which can advantageously be governed, or even whose govern- 
ment can be conveniently superintended, from a single centre.” This im- 
mediately suggests 
Hypothesis  1: The larger the size of  a state in terms of land area, 
the less centralized, other things equal, should be its public sector. 
However, there is a bit more to the economics of size and geography. 
Many public services have important economies of scale with respect 
to population size. For services with important dimensions of “pub- 
licness”  (i.e., where units of  output can be consumed by  additional 
persons without  reducing the level of  consumption  of  anyone else), 
cost per unit of  services per person varies inversely with the size of 
the population.  In  relatively  small states, population  size at decen- 
tralized levels may simply be insufficiently large to exhaust the available 
economies of scale. In such instances, it may be more economical to 
provide  these  services at  the  state rather  than  the  local level. This 
suggests 
Hypothesis 2:  The larger the population of the state, other things 
equal, the less centralized should be its public sector. 
More than simply aggregate population size is at issue here. The way 
the population of a state is distributed among its local jurisdictions is 
of central importance for the optimal degree of decentralization. The 
point  is  that to take advantage of  existing economies  of  scale with 
respect to population at the local level requires a certain concentration 
of economic units. Certain public outputs (including things like zoos, 
museums, and various specialized services) involve significant indivisi- 
bilities; the first “unit”  of  output of  such goods may  require a sub- 
stantial expenditure. Even if all persons have similar demand functions 
for such a good, it does not become efficient for a locality to provide 
the good until the sum of the individual demands exceeds its cost. In 
short, the range of  services provided at the local level will depend on 
the extent of the concentration of the population in urban areas. 
In an intriguing study of one metropolitan area, Schmandt and Ste- 
phens  (1960) found  that  the number  of  distinct  “subfunctions”  (or 
particular services) that were provided in a municipality was strongly 
and positively associated with population size. The larger a local ju- 
risdiction, the greater the range of services it provides. This suggests 14  John Joseph Wallis and Wallace E. Oates 
that if  the population  of  a state is thinly spread throughout  its land 
area, there  will  be  a  relatively  small  role for local  government.  In 
contrast, the concentration of population in urban areas will make it 
economically desirable for the local sector to provide a wider range of 
services. 
Hypothesis 3:  The larger the fraction of  a state’s  population residing 
in urban areas, the less centralized, other things equal, should be the 
state and local sector. 
The second set of considerations influencing fiscal decentralization 
involves the level of income and wealth in the state. Higher levels of 
income seem to have two effects on the extent of  decentralization- 
effects that work in opposite directions. First, it has been observed in 
a number of empirical studies (Martin and Lewis  1956; Oates  1972; 
Kee 1977; Oates  1985; Bahl and Nath  1986) that the higher-income, 
developed countries have much more decentralized public sectors than 
do the poorer, developing countries. In one of  these studies using data 
for the mid-l970s, Oates (1985) finds that for a sample of  18 industrial- 
ized nations, the mean central government share of  total public ex- 
penditure is .65; for the corresponding sample of 25 developing countries, 
the central share is .89. Higher-income countries seem to have a much 
stronger tendency toward (or history of) decentralization in the public 
sector. Several explanations have  been  suggested for this pervasive 
finding. Wheare (1964), for example, contends that decentralization is 
expensive and that a country must be  relatively affluent to adopt a 
relatively decentralized form of government. Alternatively, Martin and 
Lewis (1956) suggest that centralization is necessary in the early stages 
of development to economize on scarce administrative talent. 
This particular line of  argument, however, does not seem relevant 
to a study of  the state and local sector in the United States, for the 
finding of a significant negative relationship between per capita income 
and fiscal decentralization is limited to comparisons of developed and 
developing countries. Where the sample is limited to higher-income, 
developed countries, the relationship between income and decentral- 
ization disappears (see Kee 1977; Oates 1985).  This suggests that among 
the states within the U.S.,  which all fall within the “developed”  clas- 
sification on a world scale, this “income effect” on decentralization is 
unlikely to be of  importance. 
There is, however, a second way in  which the level of income can 
influence the extent of fiscal decentralization. It has been observed that 
the propensity to engage in income redistribution has a relatively high 
income elasticity. Wealthier polities tend to provide much more in the 
way of transfers (as a fraction of total income) to lower-income (and 
other) groups. Local governments tend to be notably circumscribed in 
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of the mobility of potential recipients (and sources) across local juris- 
dictions (see, e.g., Brown and Oates, 1987). For this and other reasons, 
programs aimed at assisting the poor tend to be more centralized than 
those involving direct  services.  On these grounds we  might  expect 
higher-income states, other things equal, to have more centralized state 
and local sectors. 
Hypothesis 4: The higher the level of per capita income in a state, 
the more centralized, other things equal, should be its public sector, 
as a result of a higher level of  involvement in redistributive programs. 
The third set of considerations relating to fiscal decentralization en- 
compasses the effects of  variations in tastes and demands for public 
services. The general  idea  here  is  a  straightforward and  seemingly 
unambiguous one: the greater the diversity of tastes and demands among 
economic units, the more likely, other things being equal, will be sig- 
nificant differences in the optimal levels of  outputs across local juris- 
dictions. This suggests that we seek some proxy variables for taste and 
demand differences for public services. 
We  expect the demand for public (like private) goods typically to 
vary positively with income; thus, one determinant of the variation in 
demand should be the degree of inequality in the distribution of income. 
This suggests that the value of the Gini coefficient will  be positively 
associated with the variation in the demand for public services. 
Hypothesis 5: The more unequal the distribution ofincome. the less 
centralized, other things equal, should be the state and local sector. 
Other proxy measures for the variation in demand for public services 
are less  clear.  We  expect  various  socioeconomic  differences  in  the 
population to manifest themselves in varying demands for public ser- 
vices. Variation in such things as the age distribution of the population, 
racial composition, and religious affiliations may well contribute to an 
increased diversity in demands for publically provided services. There 
may exist, for example, a certain life-cycle pattern to demand for public 
services with younger households with children present exhibiting a 
higher demand for things like public education than older households. 
Or, to take another possible case, states with a substantial mixture of 
religious groups, some of  which provide their own schools, may tend 
to have widely varying demands for public education. While all this 
admittedly  requires  closer  examination,  we  take  as  a  “working 
hypothesis” 
Hypothesis 6: States exhibiting more in the way of diversity as in- 
dicated by socioeconomic indicators should tend to have, other things 
equal, more decentralized public sectors. 
This last set of considerations relating to the extent of differences in 
demands for public services is subject to one important qualification. 
In order for the variation in demand for local services among the pop- 16  John Joseph Wallis and Wallace E. Oates 
ulation of a state to manifest itself in  the form of welfare gains from 
increased decentralization, there must be  some tendency for people 
with similar demands to be grouped together in  local jurisdictions.  If 
the intrastate diversity in individual demands is mirrored in each local 
jurisdiction, then there will be little in the way of differences in demands 
aggregated at the local level. It is where individuals separate themselves 
into groups with relatively homogeneous demands for public services 
(as in the Tiebout model) that the welfare gains from fiscal decentral- 
ization  reflect the diversity of  household  demands.  This  suggests  a 
further reason for expecting the optimal degree of decentralization to 
vary directly with the extent of urbanization within a state. It is within 
metropolitan  areas where  individuals can conveniently work  in  one 
jurisdiction (the central city) and live in another (a suburban commu- 
nity) that the opportunity for sorting of households in residential com- 
munities  according  to  demands  for  local  services  has  its  greatest 
potential. 
As will be discussed  in the following section, our measures of so- 
cioeconomic diversity are rather naive.  The two measures available 
over the entire sample period are the population living on farms and 
the ethnic composition of  the p~pulation.~  Our “homogeneity”  mea- 
sure is simply (PC -  .5)2,  where PC is the percentage of the population 
that is white or (under the alternative definition) living on farms. This 
variable takes on its maximum possible value of  Y4  for a completely 
homogenous population and declines to a minimum possible value of 
zero for a population that is evenly divided between the two groups. 
This measure is admittedly crude, but  we  hope that it captures the 
essential point of the hypothesis. 
Historically, however, simply the proportion of  farmers and that of 
whites  in  the  population  have also been  important  determinants  of 
public policy. Farmers are a diverse lot, but their late nineteenth-and 
early twentieth-century political goals can be subsumed under the com- 
mon label of “populism.”  While supporting a fairly wide range of social 
and economic reforms, the populists stood firmly behind the notions 
that  a small government was better  than  a large one and that local 
governments were better than more centralized governments. Agrarian 
elements, reformer or otherwise, were also leery of the “city,”  and 
states with farm majorities often apportioned state legislative districts 
to give rural areas disproportionate representation. The net effect of 
having a large share of the population living on farms is not altogether 
clear: farmers were against large cities which would tend to promote 
a more centralized state-local fisc, but they also supported smaller and 
more decentralized governments as a general principle. As the follow- 
ing section will show, accounting for the share of farmers in the pop- 
ulation is important econometrically, even if  we do not have a clear- 
cut theoretical prior on the sign of the variable. 17  Decentralization in the Public Sector 
The percentage white variable is unavoidably connected with his- 
torically centralized southern governments and with a difficulty in in- 
terpreting how race relations would affect the structure of government 
in  the South. Since Southern states have historically been more cen- 
tralized, we expect that 
Hypothesis 7:  States in the southern region of the country will, other 
things equal, have more centralized public sectors. 
Since the percentage white is considerably lower in  most southern 
states than elsewhere, simply including the percentage white will pick 
up a “southern”  effect. We  try to control for this with a dummy vari- 
able, but  a more complicated problem remains.  In many states, es- 
pecially in the South, a large part of the black population was denied 
the right to vote until the 1960s. We  do not know whether the enforce- 
ment  of  laws  (or more  informal measures) designed  to  control and 
coerce a substantial part of  the community requires a more  or less 
centralized government. We  also do not know whether the granting of 
black suffrage would have led to a movement for more or less cen- 
tralized government; it might have encouraged decentralization as black 
majorities in local government attempted to use their newly obtained 
political power in  those governments over which they  had the most 
control. As we shall see, it appears as though the level of the black 
population,  as well as our diversity  measures, may be an important 
determinant of  the degree of  ~entralization.~ 
1.4  An Econometric Study of  Fiscal Decentralization 
To  test  our set of  hypotheses on fiscal decentralization,  we  shall 
make use of a large panel data set on the state and local sector that 
we have assembled in the course of a broader historical study of U.S. 
government finance. Drawing on the U.S. Census of  Governments and 
various other sources, we have collected data on state and local gov- 
ernments and on other relevant  socioeconomic variables  at roughly 
decade intervals beginning in  1902. We  thus have nine sets of  cross- 
sectional observations on the 48 contiguous states that include data on 
expenditures, revenues, and tax receipts for state government and for 
local governments in each state. For a description of  our data base, 
we refer the reader to the appendix at the end of this paper. 
With this panel data set, we can explore both changes over time and 
differences among states in the extent of  fiscal decentralization. For 
this purpose, we have adopted the error-components technique for the 
estimation of  our regression  equations.  Using the error-components 
estimator, our general approach to the testing of our various hypotheses 
takes the form: 
(1)  Ci,  = a + bX,  +cZ,,  + si + t, + e,,, 18  John Joseph Wallis and Wallace E. Oates 
where C,  is our measure of  fiscal centralization (i.e., the state share 
of state-local spending or revenues), X, is a vector of control variables, 
Z,  is the vector of variables representing our hypotheses, si is a state- 
specific disturbance term, t, is a time-specific disturbance term, and e, 
is the normal disturbance term with zero expected mean. Part of  the 
appeal of the error-components approach is that it allows us to separate 
out an effect that is  specific to each state in our sample and also to 
each time period. The remaining component of the disturbance term 
is the usual random error term with zero mean. 
We  begin the econometric analysis by presenting the simple regres- 
sion equations involving our measures of fiscal centralization and each 
of the variables chosen to test one of  our hypotheses. We  are unable 
unfortunately to test all  the hypotheses we  set out in the preceding 
section because of limitations on our data. We  have measures for each 
state and time period on land area, population size, urbanized popu- 
lation, and per capita income. This allows us to test hypotheses one 
through four. We  do not, however,  have data on  the distribution  of 
income so that we are unable to test hypothesis five.5 Next, we have 
a set of socioeconomic variables from which we will create proxies for 
variations in tastes for public services so that we can explore hypothesis 
six. And, finally, the use of a dummy variable for southern states will 
provide a test of hypothesis seven. 
The results of  the simple regressions appear in table 1.5. Each row 
of  the  table  reports  the  results  of  the  univariate error-components 
regressions for one of our proposed explanatory variables; the first two 
columns indicate the results using the state share of  total state-local 
expenditures as the dependent variable, and the second two columns 
report the estimated equation with the state share of total  state and 
local revenues as the dependent variable. The first set of hypotheses, 
numbers one through three, relate to the size and urbanization of  the 
state. Here we find that the simple regressions provide support for two 
of  the three hypotheses. The size of  the state (measured in  terms of 
population) and the extent of urbanization both have the hypothesized 
negative coefficients, and these coefficients are statistically significant 
at the .01 level regardless of whether the expenditure or revenue vari- 
able is employed to measure fiscal centralization. Size as measured by 
land area, although  it has  the hypothesized sign, is  not  statistically 
significant  .6 
Hypothesis four proposes a positive relationship between fiscal cen- 
tralization and the level of per capita income. In the univariate regres- 
sion, however, we find an inverse association. [More on this shortly.] 
To explore hypothesis six concerning variation in tastes, we have used 
two proxies for the homogeneity of  the state’s population.  As noted 
earlier, the measures are the squares of the difference between  .5  and 19  Decentralization in the Public Sector 
Table 1.5  Simple Univariate Error-Components Regressions, Fiscal 
Concentration Measure on Selection of Independent Variables 
(Absolute 1-Statistics) 
Expenditures  Revenues 
Constant  Coefficient  Constant  Coefficient 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
LAND  AREA  0.3622  -  1.94E-07  0.4309  -7.38E-08 
(l0.3)***  (.go)  (7.7)***  (.34) 
POPULATION  0.3802  -1.01E-05  0.4392  -  4.3 E -  06 
(12.4)***  (5.9)*  *  *  (9.0)**  *  (2.5)*** 
PERCENTAGE  0.4587  -  0.2  I47  0.4956  -0.1371 
URBAN  (15.2)***  (6.7)***  (11.7)***  (4.3)*  *  * 
PER CAPITA  0.3853  -  1.9E -  05  0.476  -  2.7lE -05 
INCOME  (I  1.7)***  (1.54)  (10.5)***  (2  .,)** 
HOMOGENEITY  0.3816  -  0.3009  0.4517  -0.2428 
FARM  ( 13.6)  * *  *  (3.3)***  (10.5)***  (2.8)**  * 
WHITE  ( 10.6)*  **  (2.13)**  (8.6)***  (4.0)*  ** 
HOMOGENEITY  0.3849  -0.2075  0.4865  -0.3602 
PERCENTAGE  0.3396  0.0442  0.4265  -  0.OOO8 
FARM  (13.8)***  (1.21)  (11.3)***  (.02) 
WHITE  (8 S)**  *  (2.9)***  (8.5)** *  (3.8)*** 
PERCENTAGE  0.4962  -0.1642  0.6003  -0.1958 
Noies: Every row represents  two univariate  regressions.  In columns  (I) and  (2) the 
constant and coefficent are from a regression of the percentage of total state and local 
expenditures  undertaken  at  the  state level,  regressed on  the  individual independent 
variables.  In columns (3) and (4) the constant and coefficent are from a regression of 
the percentage of total state and local revenues undertaken at the state level, regressed 
on the individual independent variables. 
N  = 432 for all regressions 
*** =  I%  significance level 
** = 5% significance level 
* = 10% significance level 
the percentage white or the percentage residing on farms. A state with 
50 percent of its population living on farms, for example, would be as 
diverse as possible, and the farm homogeneity variable would, in this 
instance, equal zero. We  find in  table  1.5 that the univariate  results 
support neither version of hypothesis six: the estimated coefficient on 
both the farm and white homogeneity variables is negative and statis- 
tically significant in both equations, indicating that more homogeneous 
populations are associated with more decentralized governments. 
The percentage white variable has a significantly negative association 
with fiscal centralization, which probably reflects the southern effect. 
The percentage  of the population  living on farms does not exhibit a 
significant association with centralization  (with opposite signs for the 
revenue and expenditure equations). 20  John Joseph Wallis and Wallace E. Oates 
While  the  univariate  equations  are of  some  interest, a  multiple- 
regression  model  containing a set of  control variables  is  obviously 
needed to provide a more reliable test of  the various hypotheses. We 
present  in  table  1.6 the  results  of  our  error-components  multiple- 
regression analysis. The first two columns indicate the estimated coef- 
ficients for the equation using the expenditure measure of fiscal cen- 
tralization, while the second two columns report the results using the 
revenue definition for the fiscal centralization variable. The multivariate 
tests for the first three hypotheses confirm the univariate findings: the 
extent of fiscal centralization is significantly and negatively related to 
the size of the population and the percentage urban, but is not signif- 
icantly associated with land area. Larger states in terms of population 
and states whose population  is more highly urbanized  tend to have 
more decentralized fiscal systems. 
Table 1.6  Error-Components Regressions, Fiscal Concentration Measure on 
Selection of Independent Variables (absolute t-statistics) 
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(I  .48) 
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(4.3)*  * * 
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0.0377 
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(6.7)*  ** 
-  3.37E -  06 
-  0.2134 
Nofes:  The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the concentration measure for 
expenditures and in columns (3) and (4) is the concentration measure for revenues. 
N  = 432 for all regressions. 
*** =  1%  significance level. 
** = 5% significance level. 
* = 10% significance level. 21  Decentralization in the Public Sector 
When we come to the income variable, however, the results differ 
from the univariate cases: for the multivariate equations, the estimated 
coefficient on per capita income possesses the hypothesized  positive 
sign and is statistically significant in the expenditure equation. Higher 
income states thus exhibit a tendency toward more centralized state 
and  local  sectors (at  least  in  terms of  the expenditure  measure  of 
centralization).’ 
The estimated coefficients for the southern dummy variable are pos- 
itive  (as  hypothesized) and  statistically  significant.  Simply being a 
southern state seems to explain roughly a third of the difference in 
fiscal centralization between southern and northeastern states. How- 
ever, the results for the socioeconomic variables are more difficult to 
interpret.  The estimated coefficients on our homogeneity  variables, 
both percentage white and farm, are extremely sensitive to the spec- 
ification of the equation, and we hesitate to place much confidence in 
these estimates. The coefficient on the farm homogeneity variable is 
negative in all four equations, which runs counter to hypothesis six. 
There is another intrepretation of this variable in conjunction with the 
percentage farm variable in equations (2) and (4) in table  1.6. Having 
more farmers appears to produce a more decentralized government, 
but at a decreasing rate. Or, what may be the more appropriate way 
to phrase that  statement in  the American  historical  context: having 
fewer farmers (as has happened over time) leads to a more centralized 
government, and does so at an increasing  rate.  This effect is  quite 
interesting in light of the strong negative effect that urbanization exerts 
on centralization, as it indicates that we cannot simply think of per- 
centage farm and percentage urban as proxies for one another. 
The racial homogeneity variable has the predicted  positive  sign in 
equation (2) and is statistically significant. But it is negative in the other 
three equations in Table 1.6. The estimated coefficient for percentage 
white is negative in both instances, but statistically significant only in 
equation (2). We  find these results difficult to interpret. Taken at face 
value, the results in equation (2) indicate that a larger white population 
results in greater decentralization but at a diminishing rate. The white 
“decentralization  effect”  is increasingly offset by  the  “diversity  ef- 
fect” as percentage white rises toward 100 percent. 
Finally, we thought it would be of interest to compare our results 
for the error-components analysis covering the entire period of eighty 
years with the set of cross-sectional multiple-regression equations for 
each  decade.  We  present  in  table  1.7 the estimated cross-sectional 
equations for each of our observed years (using ordinary least squares). 
The estimated equations use the expenditure definition of the dependent 
variable.8 While the overall results correspond roughly to our earlier 22  John Joseph Wallis and Wallace E. Oates 
Table 1.7  OLS Regressions. Fiscal Concentration Measure on Selection of 
Independent Variables by Year,  1902 to 1982 (absolute t-statistic) 



















4.09E-08  -  1.14E-07 
(1.99)*  (.37) 
-  1.08E-05  -8.38E-06 
(I .93)*  (I  .29) 
(2.03)**  (2.64)** 
(I  .05)  (1.41) 
0.2753  0.5569 
(1.15)  (I .6l) 
(2.01)*  (.23) 
(2.31)**  (1.15) 
-0.6444  0. I47 
(3.61)***  (.49) 
0.0261  -0.043 
(.64)  (  .79) 
0.8056  0.4787 
(6.5)***  (2.12)** 
0.67  0.35 
-0.2139  -0.3637 
-5.27E-05  -1.lOE-04 
0.8875  -0.154 
0.2356  -0.21 I7 
-  2.06E -08  -  2.10E -07  -  3.84E -  07 
~07)  (.79)  (1.36) 
(2.22)**  (1.85)'  (.65) 
(.66)  (2.47)**  (3.55)*** 
7.04E -05  6.98E -05  -  2.4lE -  05 
(  .84)  (1.28)  (.44) 
-0.2164  -0.1137  0.7401 
(.56)  (24)  (I  .22) 
-  1.404  -0,3403  -0.8996 
(1.83)*  (.38)  (  .89) 
(31)  (37)  (I  .30) 
0.5052  0.0436  0.5309 
(1.31)  (.09)  (.92) 
-0.025  0.0371  0.0359 
(.75)  (.70) 
0.  I031  0.5157  0.5139 
(.35)  (I  .49)  (1.18) 
0.37  0.60  0.46 
-1.27E-04  -9.96E-06  -3.66E-06 
-0.0922  -0.3881  -0.6506 
-0.0988  -0.1183  -0,3778 
findings, a cursory examination of the table indicates that the results 
vary considerably  from one period to the next; the estimated coeffi- 
cients on many  of the variables  exhibit  substantial  changes in  their 
magnitude and the values of  their t-statistics from one period  to the 
next.  The population  and percentage  urban variables,  however,  are 
consistently negative (with only one exception) and often statistically 
significant. 
In summary, our econometric results, while admittedly  somewhat 
mixed, do provide support for several of the hypotheses. We find that 
the extent of fiscal centralization varies inversely and significantly with 
both population size and urbanization (although not significantly with 
land area). In addition, we have found a positive relationship (at least 
in the multivariate error-components analysis) between fiscal central- 
ization and the level of per capita income. This is consistent with the 
view that higher-income states will have a more pronounced inclination 
to engage in redistributive activities which tend to have a dispropor- 
tionately  large  role  for the  state government. As suggested  by  the 
historical discussion, we have found that southern states (at least until 
quite recently) have relatively centralized state and local fiscs. Finally, 
we obtained  quite mixed (and often puzzling) results  with  our racial 23  Decentralization in the Public Sector 
Table 1.7  (continued) 
1952  1962  I972  1982 
LAND  -  3.0  1  E -  07 
(I .07) 
(1.15) 
URBAN  (3.8)**  * 
PER CAPITA  1.62E-05 
INCOME  (.35) 
HOMOGENEITY  1.467 
FARM  (I  .61) 
HOMOGENEITY  -0.9271 
WHITE  (.74) 
PERCENTAGE  -0.1491 
FARM  (.29) 
PERCENTAGE  0.7064 
WHITE  (.93) 
SOUTHERN  0.0697 
DUMMY  (1.35) 
Constant  0.277 
(.48) 
R2  0.53 
POPULATION  -  5.97E -  06 
PERCENTAGE  -0.8729 
2.25E -07  -9.90E  -08  -  2.70E -07 
(I  .04)  (.44)  (1.33) 
(3.19)***  (2.18)**  (2.15)** 
(3.42)***  (1.56)  (1.29) 
-  3.688 -05  -8.458-05  -2.65E  -05 
(.94)  (2.39)**  (.97) 
1.396  3.297  I I .201 
(I  .24)  (1.81)*  (2.37)** 
0.0621  0.4963  -0.2163 
-9.55E-06  -5.77E-06  -4.80E-06 
-0.4959  -0.1905  -0.1493 
(.05)  (.39) 
0.33  2.037  9.262 
(.45)  (1.48)  (2.32)** 
0.0631  0.0424  0.2931 
(.W  (.03  (.33) 
0.0291  0.0493  0.0276 
(.78)  (I .49)  (1 .w 
(.98)  (.W  (1.74)* 
0.66  0.66  0.54 
0.4959  -0.0389  -  2.321 1 
Nores: The dependent variable in all regressions is the state share of combined state and 
local expenditures. 
N  = 48 for all regressions 
*** =  I%  significance. 
** = 5%  significance. 
* =  10% significance. 
and farm variables. Although they often have significant explanatory 
power in the regression equations, they do not provide clear support 
for hypothesis six and present formidable problems of interpretation. 
1.5  Some Reflections on Future Trends in Fiscal Centralization 
As we have seen, the twentieth century has been a period over which 
the state and local sector has exhibited a strong tendency toward in- 
creased fiscal centralization.  Is this a trend that is likely to continue? 
This is not an easy question to answer, but we would like to offer some 
thoughts. At the turn of  the present century, the fiscal  role of  state 
governments was a very modest one. However, various developments 
brought an increased demand for important new public services, no- 
tably highways, higher education, and public assistance programs, that 
were appropriately  placed in  the domain of  state government. As a 24  John Joseph Wallis and Wallace E. Oates 
result, the fiscal share of state government in the state and local sector 
rose dramatically. But, as we saw, this rise in the extent of fiscal cen- 
tralization was primarily a phenomenon of the first half of the century. 
The trend toward further fiscal centralization has slowed dramatically 
(if not ceased altogether). From this perspective, it would appear that 
the forces behind  the trend toward  centralization  are largely history 
now; without some new thrust for state-level intervention, there would 
seem to be little reason to expect further centralization of the state and 
local sector. 
On closer examination,  there appear to be some such centralizing 
forces still at work-at  least to a modest degree. The primary force is 
a continuing concern with so-called fiscal equalization: the more equal 
access of all socioeconomic groups to “satisfactory” levels of public 
services. This concern (although by no means new) has been reinforced 
by court decisions on public education and various restrictions on local 
finances, and is no doubt partly responsible for the continuing tendency 
toward heavier reliance on intergovernmental aid to local governments. 
Equalizing grants from the states have provided a means for reducing 
the fiscal disparities between wealthier and poorer localities. 
At the same time, there are some reasons to expect the potential 
welfare gains from decentralized finance to remain substantial and per- 
haps to grow over time. A basic mechanism for the realization of these 
gains is the mobility of individuals, permitting the formation of com- 
munities that are relatively  homogeneous  in their demands for local 
services. The development of metropolitan areas in which individuals 
work in one locality (perhaps the central city) but reside in a nearby 
residential community provides a setting well suited to the realization 
of the gains from  local finance.  Rising incomes, improved transpor- 
tation, and the increasing mobility of individuals would  suggest that 
the potential gains from decentralization  should remain substantial. 
Our overall econometric results point to these divergent forces. If 
population and urbanization continue to grow, this will create pressures 
for more decentralized  government. However, the positive effect of 
income  growth  on fiscal  centralization  should  continue; indeed  the 
concern with equalization may be the manifestation of a kind of income 
effect. But the other major source of centralization, the declining num- 
ber of farmers, cannot be expected to contribute much to centralization 
in the future. 
There are thus forces at work, some of which favor increased cen- 
tralization, but others of which increase the relative gains from decen- 
tralized  finance.  Any  prediction  of  outcomes  is  thus  extremely 
precarious. However, we would venture the conjecture that the local 
sector is unlikely, at least in terms of expenditure responsibilities, to 
experience much further diminution in its relative fiscal role over the 25  Decentralization in the Public Sector 
next few decades. The local provision of services promises important 
welfare gains that will not go unnoticed. 
Appendix 
The variables used in this paper are taken from a variety of Commerce 
Department sources and are, for the most part, exactly what they seem. 
Problems  arose occasionally  from gaps in  the available  series. This 
appendix describes how the gaps where bridged. 
The fiscal  variables,  revenues and expenditures by  state for state 
and local governments, were taken from the decennial Census of Gov- 
ernments. This census was taken in  1902, 1913, 1922, 1932, 1942, 1962, 
1972, and 1982 (with additional censuses taken in 1927, 1957,1967, and 
1977). A census was contemplated, but not taken, in  1952. Coverage 
of local governments in the 1902, 1913, and 1922 censuses vaned slightly. 
And the 1922 census did not include a complete enumeration of local 
government expenditures. These gaps were filled by  several interpo- 
lation techniques. 
The 1902 census of governments recorded complete information on 
public revenues and expenditures for all  levels of government.y The 
1913 Census of Governments included all governments except for places 
with  population less than 2,5OO.’O The 1922 Census of Governments 
included information on receipts for all levels of government, and ex- 
penditures for state governments only.” 
To account for the exclusion of governments in places with less than 
2,500 population, we utilized the breakdown of government expendi- 
tures by population size in the 1902 census. The 1902 returns reported 
fiscal totals for cities with population of 8,000 to 25,000 and all minor 
subdivisions. The 1913 Census reported fiscal totals for all cities with 
population of 2,500 to 8,000 but for no smaller units. Both censuses 
reported totals for larger cities and counties. We  calculated revenues 
and expenditures of  minor subdivisions (cities with under 8,000 pop- 
ulation) as a percentage  of revenues and expenditures for cities with 
over 8,000 population and counties in  1902. Then revenues and ex- 
penditures for cities with over 8,000 population and counties in 1913 
were multiplied by the 1902 shares to generate an estimate of “all minor 
subdivision”  revenues and expenditures for  1913. 
The revenue data for 1922 were fairly complete. We  were able to 
collect total revenue and expenditure data for state governments, as 
well as local  tax revenues and local  revenue from state grants. The 
census department estimated a nationwide total for local revenues in 
1922 at $4,148 million.I2 We  assumed that the ratio of local nongrant 26  John Joseph Wallis and Wallace E. Oates 
total revenues to tax revenues was the same in  each state as it had 
been in 1913, and calculated an estimated nongrant total revenue figure 
for 1922. The estimated nationwide total was slightly higher than the 
census estimate, and therefore every state was adjusted by a common 
factor (.927469) to bring our total revenues in line with the census total. 
Finally, we estimated local expenditure by assuming that the ratio of 
expenditures to revenues in each state was the same as the nationwide 
estimates made by  the census.13 
Complete state level data were available for 1953, but no local data 
were collected. Information on local revenues was collected in 1953 and 
that information was used to construct estimates of local revenues and 
expenditures for 1952. Specifically, the census department estimated that 
nationwide local revenues in 1952 were .91 of the total local revenue in 
1953. We  simply adjusted the 1953 revenue figures by .91 to obtain our 
1952 estimates. The census also estimated that local expenditures in  1952 
were  I .2 times greater than revenues, and we calculated local expen- 
ditures by multiplying our revenue estimate by 1.2. 
The control variables where comparatively easy to assemble. From 
Historical  Statistics it  was possible to collect population, land size, 
racial composition, and urban population for each decade. Note that 
the census data refer to census years (years ending in  0), while the 
financial variables refer to the relevant Census of  Government years. 
The one variable that caused a problem was per capita income. 
Per capita income is available in Historical Statistics from 1929 on. 
Before 1929 the state level income estimates of Richard Easterlin (1957) 
are available for the years 1900 and 1920. Nationwide GNP per capita 
was $246 in  1900, $382 in  1910, and $860 in  1920. Of  the total growth 
in income between  1900 and 1920, therefore, .2215 occurred between 
1900 and  1910. We  took 22.15 percent of  the income growth in each 
state between  1900 and  1920, and added it to the 1900 income figure 
from Easterlin to estimate per-capita income in each state for 1910. 
Notes 
1. The years are mainly those during which there was a Census of Govern- 
ments in the United States (see the appendix). 
2. For a more rigorous treatment of the determinants of the optimal degree 
of decentralization,  see Oates (1972, appendix to chapter 2). 
3.  We  also  have information on the age structure of  the population, but 
including variables on age structure had no measurable effects on the results; 
these variables were not statistically significant in the regression analysis. 
4. Including a measure of the share of whites in the population along with 
our racial homogeneity variable in the same equation raises some tricky issues 27  Decentralization in the Public Sector 
of  interpretation.  There is  the question  of  whether this  specification  is any 
different than one which enters the white share variable in a nonlinear form 
with both linear and square terms. If one believes that the homogeneity of the 
population (as measured by the squared deviation from one-half of the fraction 
of the population that is white) influences fiscal centralization, then the spec- 
ification including both  PC and (PC - .5)l is appropriate. However, this is 
admittedly  a  restrictive  specification; in  particular,  it  imposes a symmetry 
condition on the effects of homogeneity (i.e., 55 percent white has the same 
effect as 45 percent white). If our specification is not the correct one, then of 
course there may well be some confounding of measured effects between the 
share and homogeneity variables. We  have examined some other (and more 
complicated) specifications, but they have not altered the main empirical find- 
ings in the paper (these results are available from the authors). The interpre- 
tation of the homogeneity measure depends upon the particular specification, 
but not always in a way that is easily characterized. Since the results for these 
variables are quite sensitive to specification, we are reluctant to place much 
weight on them in this paper.  But as the results in the next section indicate, 
there does seem to be something here that merits further investigation. This 
discussion applies as well  to our treatment of the farm variables,  where we 
include in  the regression equations measures of both  the share of the farm 
population and a farm homogeneity variable. 
5. In a cross-sectional study of fiscal decentralization  using data for 1969- 
70, Giertz (1976) finds that the Gini coefficient is positively and significantly 
associated  with  the extent of  fiscal  centralization,  suggesting that a higher 
degree of inequality  in  the distribution of income is  associated with a more 
centralized state and local sector. This finding runs counter to our hypothesis 
five. Giertz argues that this result reflects the greater need for income redis- 
tribution in states with more inequality. 
6. In an earlier cross-sectional study using data for 1962, Litvack and Oates 
(1970) likewise found population size and percentage  urban to be negatively 
and significantly associated  with  fiscal  centralization  in  the state and local 
sector. Giertz (1976) found, in addition, a negative and significant relationship 
between fiscal centralization and land area. 
7. Giertz (1976) found such a relationship in his cross-sectional study. 
8. The results using the revenue version of the dependent variable do not 
differ in any important ways from those reported in table 1.7. 
9. U.S. Bureau of the Census (1907). Receipt and Expenditure data taken 
from Table 10, pp. 982-93. 
10.  U.S. Bureau  of  the Census (1914). Receipt and expenditure data for 
states taken from Table 6, pp. 36-37,  Table 8, pp. 40-41.  Table 10, pp. 44- 
45; for counties Table 3, pp. 122-23  and Table 5, pp. 210-1  I; for incorporated 
places Table 3, pp. 462-69  and Table 5, pp. 560-67. 
11. U.S. Bureau of the Census (1924). Receipts for local governments taken 
from Table 1, pp.  12-16.  Receipts and expenditures taken from Table 2, p. 17, 
Table 3, pp. 52-53,  and Table 4, p. 54. 
12. The census estimates for local finances were based on information gath- 
ered by  the census from a sample of large cities and scattered data collected 
by the census bureau. Estimates of local government finances were built  up 
from these partial samples. We have used these estimates to fill in missing data 
in  1922 and in  1952. 
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Comment  James R. Hines. Jr. 
John Wallis and Wallace Oates present an intriguing  analysis of twentieth- 
century trends in state and local public finance. As its title suggests, their 
paper focuses on the pattern and causes of public sector decentralization, 
where the authors understand “centralization” to mean the extent to which 
state governments account for total state and local spending or  revenues. 
As their table 1.1 illustrates, the striking feature of recent state and local 
fiscal relations is the sharp rise around World War I1  in state spendingand 
revenues relative to local spendingand revenues. Hence, the subnational 
public sector is more centralized now than it was in the first three decades 
of this century. 
Wallis and Oates seek to understand whether this pattern represents 
an economically efficient adjustment by different levels of government 
to changing underlying factors. The seven hypotheses they specify and 
test capture in  part the intuition that public sector centralization is 
more desirable with a homogeneous population.  This conclusion fol- 
lows from assuming the functions of state and local governments to be 
the provision of substitute public goods.  Since additional consumers 
can enjoy public goods at little (or zero) cost, simple cost-sharing argues 
for state rather than local provision of most public goods. On the other 
hand, citizens of  a state must all consume the same bundle of public 
goods, despite their potentially divergent demands for public services. 
The more divergent these demands are, the more sense it may make 
for localities to provide a large fraction of the public goods and tailor 
them to local needs. 
It  is  hard  to  know  quite what  to make  of  this  efficient-response 
approach to public expenditures and the tests Wallis and Oates employ 
to evaluate it. One difficulty is the absence of a formal model, with the 
result that it is not easy to tell whether the data confirm or reject the 
theory. Presumably, the model requires the public services provided 
by  different levels of  government to be  imperfect  substitutes, since 
otherwise it is always most efficient for state (or national) governments 
to provide all the services. If  public parks are all perfect substitutes, 
then it is not efficient for cities to build parks and exclude nonresidents 
from  them;  instead,  states should pay  for them.  The nature  of  the 
efficient division of fiscal responsibility depends crucially on the sub- 
stitutability or complementarity of different public services, as well as 
crowding, scale economies, and other size variables. As a result, most 
James  R.  Hines,  Jr.,  is  assistant  professor of economics and  public  affairs  at  the 
Woodrow  Wilson School, Princeton University, and a faculty  research fellow  of the 
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behavioral responses are consistent with  the  simple hypothesis that 
governments divide responsibilities efficiently. 
A second difficulty is that even the desirability of disparate multilevel 
government expenditure levels does not require the “decentralization” 
of the state-local sector. Suppose that some jurisdictions within a state 
demand extensive subsidized public transportation  while other parts 
of the state do not need such services. There is nothing statutory which 
prevents state governments from adjusting tax and spending levels to 
local tastes and needs. Of course, there may be strong political reasons 
for state governments not to favor some jurisdictions with services or 
light tax burdens at the expense of others. But it is easy to cite many 
examples of state (or national) governments doing exactly this. 
Since the heterogeneity  of  local demands for public services plays 
such an important role in  Wallis and Oates’s explanation  of  decen- 
tralization patterns, it is worth considering whether state governments 
may feel compelled to equate tax or spending levels across  jurisdictions 
for reasons other than a vague political desire for equality. Another 
reason  why  states may  feel  constrained to divide taxes and public 
services among jurisdictions to an inefficient degree is that information 
on local tastes for public services is not always available to state gov- 
ernments.  If  asked, localities would always claim to need extensive 
services and to possess fiscal characteristics (such as a real estate sector 
which responds elastically to local property taxes) which make it de- 
sirable to tax them lightly. The state government’s problem then is to 
elicit truthful  revelation  of  local preferences.  Naturally,  an extreme 
resolution of this problem is to decentralize the public sector by making 
localities rely on their own resources. Localities then have no incentives 
to distort their fiscal choices and in addition bear tax burdens which 
are generally (assuming no incidence spillovers) matched to the services 
they receive. But states need rely on decentralization only when they 
cannot obtain the information necessary to refine their tax and spending 
plans -  and then only when characteristics differ among local juris- 
dictions. Note, however, that if characteristics differ systematically on 
the basis of observable features then state governments can target tax 
and spending programs based on those features. 
A third reason why state governments may  impose equal tax and 
benefit levels across communities is that population is mobile within a 
state  (as well  as across  states) and the state government may  fear 
excessive Tiebout shifting in response to unequal treatment of substate 
jurisdictions.  While there is little conclusive evidence that taxpayers 
move in response to fiscal changes, it is possible that state governments 
perceive such movement  to be a potential  problem and respond by 
smoothing taxes and expenditures across jurisdictions. 
One limitation of the empirical work Wallis and Oates present is that 
it is not  capable of  identifying changes in  the desirability of  decen- 31  Decentralization in  the Public Sector 
tralization based on the second or third of  these reasons. Wallis and 
Oates regress the degree of centralization on variables such as income, 
urbanization, population, and racial homogeneity, all of  which are in- 
tended  to capture the heterogeneity  of  local demands for public ex- 
penditures.  But if  these characteristics are in  fact related to desired 
expenditure levels, then state governments can infer from demographic 
variables desired spending levels throughout the state and the problem 
of demand revelation need not affect the degree of  centralization. If, 
on the other hand, state governments have legitimate fears of population 
movements  in  response  to  fiscal  changes,  then  Wallis  and  Oates’s 
regression  strategy of  assuming population  characteristics  to be  ex- 
ogenous is flawed and the model is not identified. 
Another  limitation of  Wallis and  Oates’s  regressions  is  that  they 
measure public services by  expenditures rather than by  true service 
flow. Of  course, this problem is ubiquitous in public finance analysis, 
since there are no reliable measures of public sector output. This prob- 
lem becomes important whenever there are large changes in the cost 
of public services. If one thinks of public services as effective services 
per capita, then an increase in the heterogeneity of demands for public 
services raises their cost. But the response of total expenditures to a 
price change is ambiguous in  sign: if  the price rises and the demand 
elasticity is less than one, then total expenditures increase; if elasticity 
is greater than one expenditures fall. Thus, state-level  expenditures 
may  rise  in  response to a change  in  population  characteristics  that 
makes local expenditures relatively more desirable. This is not to say 
that local expenditures might not rise relative to state expenditures in 
such a scenario. But the sign and magnitude of the relative change will 
depend on specific price and income elasticities. 
There is an empirical issue which is closely related to this theoretical 
ambiguity. The question has to do with the choice of an appropriate 
scale variable with which to measure centralization. Wallis and Oates 
choose as their  index the  ratio of  state to total  state/local taxes or 
expenditures. This ratio has been rising over time, but there are many 
possible sources of this change. Table CI .I indicates that both the state 
and local sectors have been growing relative to GNP over this century, 
though the state sector has been growing at a faster rate. Since most 
variables of economic importance exhibit secular growth, the growth 
of state expenditures relative to local expenditures could be explained 
by  a greater state spending elasticity with respect to income, popula- 
tion, other government spending, or many other variables. 
It  is  noteworthy  in  this  context  that  Wallis  and  Oates get  much 
stronger results when they pool the data as reported in their table 1.6 
than  in  the  cross-sectional results  reported  in table  1.7. What  this 
suggests is that rising income and other variables have been correlated 
with a rise in centralization, but that secular trends of unknown origin 32  John Joseph Wallis and Wallace E. Oates 







1902  0.63%  4.44% 
1913  0.75  4.95 
1922  1.46  6.15 
1932  3.48  10.93 
1942  2.25  4.64 
1952  3.10  5.77 
1962  4.51  7.97 
I972  6.11  9.95 
1982  6.89  10.15 
Source: Author’s calculations from data in Tax Foundation (1986). 
may be driving this correlation since the data do not support the theory 
in the cross sections. The variables that do not change over time, land 
area and the southern effect, are not significant. On the other hand, 
the authors find the predicted  sign for the population variable, which 
would not be expected just on the basis of secular drift, and the ur- 
banization variable is significant in both the cross-sectional and panel 
regressions. 
Fundamentally, the analysis of subnational fiscal centralization must 
concern itself with the political forces driving state and local relations, 
and it seems that Wallis and Oates’s results should be interpreted as 
throwing some light on these forces. It is difficult to attach too strong 
an economic interpretation to their findings, since the best economic 
explanation still requires state governments to feel politically obliged 
to equalize spending and tax levels among different groups in the pop- 
ulation. The degree to which economic and  political considerations 
interact is very much an open question. More generally, political con- 
siderations may affect the extent to which state-level fiscal activity is 
“centralized” and local-level activity is “decentralized.”  Central Park 
in New York City is likely enjoyed by a larger and more heterogeneous 
group of people than is Taconic State Park in New York  State; does 
this make it more “centralized”? A fuller understanding of the nature 
of state-local fiscal relations may have to wait for more complete inter- 
pretations of the political and economic consequences of  taxing and 
spending. 
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